We study a mechanism design problem in which players can take part in a mechanism to coordinate their actions in a default game. By refusing to participate in the mechanism, a player can revert to playing the default game non-cooperatively. We show with an example that some allocation rules are implementable only with mechanisms which will be rejected on the equilibrium path. In our construction, a refusal to participate conveys information about the types of the players. This information causes the default game to be played under di¤erent beliefs, and more importantly under di¤erent higher order beliefs, than the interim ones. We …nd a lower bound on all the implementable payo¤s. We use this bound to establish a condition on the default game under which all the implementable outcomes are truthfully implementable, without the need to induce rejection of the mechanism.
Introduction
There are many mechanism design problems that involve agreements about how to play some default game. Cartel agreements govern how …rms compete against one another; members of an auction bidding ring agree on how they should bid against each other; trade agreements limit governments'ability to use trade barriers to increase their share of trade; organizations govern the e¤orts of workers who might otherwise compete against one another. Binding agreements on how players should act in an otherwise strategic setting often require unanimous consent of these players. One cannot coerce a …rm into a cartel or a sovereign state into an international treaty. Any potential participant can veto the agreement and revert to playing the default game non-cooperatively.
In this paper, we argue that when the outside option of the participants is the non-cooperative play of a default game, the design problem is substantially di¤erent from the standard one where the outside option is an exogenous allocation. In particular, we show that there are allocation rules that are implementable in this setting, only if the mechanism designer o¤ers mechanisms which will be rejected by some types of some players. Since the participation decision is type dependent, a refusal to participate conveys information that causes the default game to be played di¤erently than it would be if players used only their interim beliefs.
In order to make this point, we develop an example based on a possible cartel agreement between two oligopolists, one of which has a hidden production cost. 1 If these …rms cannot agree on the cartel mechanism, they will play the default Cournot game. Suppose that the designer o¤ers an agreement which is acceptable by the low cost type of the informed …rm but not by its high cost type. In this case, this …rm will be signaling its cost level to its uninformed rival with its decision to participate in the cartel. Accordingly, whenever the cartel agreement is rejected, these …rms will play the default Cournot game under the updated beliefs (and the updated higher order beliefs) on the cost of the informed …rm.
The induced modi…cation in the information structure changes the optimal default game behavior of the …rms involved. In particular, once the low cost type of the informed …rm is given the ability to signal its cost to the rival …rm, it will act more aggressively (choose a higher output level) in the default Cournot game. Therefore the initially uninformed …rm will expect a lower Cournot pro…t in comparison to its pro…t under the interim beliefs. In Section 2, we show that the designer can use this particular feature of the Cournot game to implement an allocation rule which would have been unacceptable to the uninformed …rm if the default game was played under the interim beliefs.
Existence of allocation rules which are implementable only through equilibrium rejection (that is, rejection of the mechanism on the equilibrium path) presents a major di¢ culty for the characterization of all the implementable allocation rules. Nevertheless we show that the default game yields a lower bound on the implementable payo¤s. With the help of this lower bound we …nd a condition on the default game under which all implementable allocation rules are truthfully implementable without the need to induce an equilibrium rejection. In Section 2, we give the intuition for these two observations by using our Cournot example. In Section 3, we develop them into general results in the framework of a model with an arbitrary default game.
When the outside option is a default game, a cartel mechanism generates a sequential game of incomplete information between the …rms involved. A sensible treatment of this game demands a sequential rationality restriction, which requires the …rms'actions in the default game to be consistent with the beliefs they hold at the time they act. This justi…es our choice of Perfect Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept. In contrast, using the Bayesian equilibrium (which is not perfect) would have eliminated the relevance of the belief updates by the …rms. This is best illustrated by Myerson's model of games with contracts (1991, Chapter 6). In this model, a mechanism can still instruct the complying players how they should play the default game when there exists some other player(s) rejecting it. Since Myerson uses Bayesian equilibrium as the solution concept, there is no sequential rationality restriction on the post-rejection instructions of the mechanisms. If our default Cournot game is played with such Myerson mechanisms, in the event that one …rm rejects the mechanism and the other one accepts, the mechanism may instruct the complying …rm to ‡ood the market by setting a high enough production level. Such an instruction rules out the possibility of making a pro…t by rejecting the mechanism and …xes the outside option for each …rm as zero pro…t. 2 Hence, the problem reduces to a standard design problem, eliminating the need for an equilibrium rejection. 3;4 When the outside option is an exogenously speci…ed allocation rule, demanding sequential rationality o¤ the equilibrium path does not restrain the mechanism designer. Moreover, as Myerson demonstrates, once we give up sequential rationality, a default game boils down to an allocation rule. If one is willing to use Bayesian equilibrium instead of Perfect Bayesian, there is no conceptual di¤erence between default games and type contingent allocations as outside options. On the other hand, if the objective is to understand the restrictions that the default game imposes, then the relevant solution concept must be Perfect Bayesian equilibrium or some other re…nement of Bayesian equilibrium based on sequential rationality.
The Example

The Cournot Game with Private Cost
We build our example on an industry with two …rms which are (potential) producers of an homogenous good. Both …rms have linear cost functions. Firm 1 has the unit cost 0.7. The unit cost of …rm 2 is either high (h =1) or low (l =0.65). The realization of its own unit cost is private information 2 What is relevant here is not the magnitude of the rejection pro…t, but the fact that it is independent of the allocation rule implemented by the mechanism. Under complete information, Myerson shows that any implementable allocation rule is implementable with unanimous acceptance of a mechanism, which punishes a rejecting player by minimaxing his payo¤ in the default game. 3 Auctions with externalities, as studied by Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti (1996 and 1999) constitute another example of such mechanisms. In this setting, a bidder who does not acquire the auctioned object may incur a negative externality if a competitor receives the object. Jehiel, Moldovanu, and Stacchetti show that the seller may extract surplus even from the bidders who do not acquire the object. The seller achieves this by threatening the bidders to give the object to their strongest competitor if they do not participate. 4 Another way of modeling mechanisms which are not completely void after rejection is proposed by Dequiedt (2006) . According to his model, once a mechanism is rejected, players choose sequentially rational actions in the default game. However, a rejected mechanism can still send messages to players, providing relevant information on the types of the complying players.
for …rm 2. 5 The inverse demand function for the good is given as P = 1 (q 1 + q 2 ), where P is the price and q 1 , q 2 are the production levels for …rms 1 and 2 respectively. These …rms make their production decisions simultaneously to maximize their expected pro…t levels.
We let 2 denote the probability that …rm 1 assigns to the event that …rm 2 has the low cost. This belief of …rm 1 is common knowledge between the …rms. In the Appendix (Section 5.1), we show that the resulting game of incomplete information has a unique Bayesian equilibrium (BE), where …rm 1 sets q 1 = 
2
, is increasing in the same parameter. In other words, …rm 1 loses out as it becomes more likely that its rival has the low cost, whereas …rm 2 (with low cost) bene…ts from being perceived as the low cost.
We construct our example under the assumption that …rm 1's belief on …rm 2's type is uniform at the start of their interaction, i.e., 2 = 0:5 at the interim stage. However, what is central to our study is understanding how these …rms change their behavior when there is a change in their beliefs. Therefore, the pro…t functions 1 ( ) and 2 (l; ), which are derived as functions of arbitrary beliefs, will prove to be useful throughout our analysis.
The Cartel Agreement
Suppose these two …rms are able to sign a cartel agreement prior to making their production decisions. Following Cramton and Palfrey (1990), we model the cartel as a mechanism that is o¤ered by a third party, which we will call the designer. The designer does not know the type of …rm 2, and does not posses any private information herself. Our aim in this paper is to discuss what this designer is capable of doing, rather than what she would choose to do. Therefore we will not be very speci…c on the designer's objective for now.
She may be maximizing a weighted average of the …rms'expected pro…ts or any other function of the …rms'production and pro…t levels.
The mechanism induces a message game, where the messages from the two …rms are mapped into output levels for the …rms and monetary side transfers between them.
6 Firms maximize their expected pro…t level net of the side transfer. When o¤ered a mechanism, each …rm has an inalienable right to reject it and play the Cournot game non-cooperatively. Following the literature, we assume that the …rms make their rati…cation decisions simultaneously. If both …rms accept the mechanism, then they send their messages to the mechanism, which in turn determines the output and side transfer levels. If either one of the …rms rejects the mechanism, then they learn which …rm(s) rejected it and play the Cournot game by choosing their production levels simultaneously. The design problem in this setup is nonstandard since the rejection payo¤s are not exogenously speci…ed but are determined by the subsequent actions of the …rms.
The Equilibrium
After the announcement of a mechanism, the interaction between the …rms can be considered as a sequential game of imperfect information. The solution concept we consider here is Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE). This solution concept is de…ned as a collection of sequentially rational strategies (which govern the rati…cation decisions of the …rms, their message choices if the mechanism takes e¤ect, and their production decisions if the mechanism is rejected) and consistent beliefs (on the type of …rm 2 after observing this …rm's rati…cation decision). 7 We provide the formal de…nitions of strategies, beliefs, and PBE in Section 3 within the framework of a more general model allowing for an arbitrary default game.
An allocation rule in this environment is de…ned as a mapping from the set of the …rms'type pro…les (in the context of our example, this is a binary set) to randomizations over the production and side transfer levels of the …rms. A mechanism implements an allocation rule if there exists a PBE after the announcement of the mechanism, which supports the allocation rule in question. An allocation rule is called implementable if there exists a mechanism implementing it. 8 In a direct revelation mechanism, the message set for each …rm is identical to its type space (implying a singleton message set for …rm 1 and a binary one for …rm 2 in our example). Suppose there exists a PBE after the announcement of a direct revelation mechanism such that all types of all …rms accept the mechanism and reveal their types truthfully with their messages. In this case, the resulting allocation rule is called truthfully implementable.
O¤ the Equilibrium Path Beliefs
Whether a …rm will accept a cartel mechanism depends on the continuation payo¤ it expects from accepting or rejecting it. Our discussion will be mainly based on the rejection payo¤ to be received from the default Cournot game. If this game is played under the interim belief 2 = 0:5, …rm 1 and the low cost type of …rm 2 receive the BE pro…t levels of 1 (0:5) = 1:3061 10 2 respectively. However, Perfect Bayesian equilibrium allows for updating this belief after observing the rati…cation decision of …rm 2. For instance, if a rejection is fully attributed to its high cost type, then the low cost type of …rm 2 would receive only 2 (l; 0) = 1 10 2 from the default Cournot game. This observation suggests that the designer may truthfully implement an allocation rule which leaves a payo¤ of 1 10 2 to this …rm: If both types of …rm 2 are expected to accept a direct revelation mechanism, it is possible to assign the degenerate belief of 2 = 0 in case of an o¤ the equilibrium path rejection by …rm 2.
Manipulation of the belief on the type of a party who unexpectedly rejects a mechanism is well studied in the design literature. Standard solution concepts, including the Perfect Bayesian equilibrium, do not put much re-striction on such o¤ the equilibrium path beliefs. The earlier literature is mostly concerned with how to re…ne such beliefs to …nd more plausible ways to outline what is feasible in a design setup. 9 In contrast to this literature, we do not employ any such re…nement here. Instead, we take almost the opposite route and examine a larger class of equilibria, where rejection of the mechanism may be on the equilibrium path.
Equilibrium Path Rejection
The discussion above points out that …rm 2 (with low cost) may accept a mechanism under the threat of a belief update, since its pro…t in the default Cournot game depends on its rival's belief 2 . We know from the construction of function 1 ( 2 ) that the same parameter also determines …rm 1's expected default Cournot pro…t. However, rejection of a mechanism by …rm 1 cannot lead to an update of 2 , which is …rm 1's own belief on the type of …rm 2. In fact, in any PBE, where both types of …rm 2 accept the mechanism with probability one, …rm 1 receives at least its expected Cournot pro…t under its interim belief: 1 (0:5) 1: 4745 10 2 . We now consider another class of PBE, where …rm 2's rati…cation behavior reveals its type. Suppose the mechanism is accepted by the low cost type of …rm 2 but rejected by its high cost type. Recall that …rm 1 observes …rm 2's rati…cation decision. Therefore consistency requirement of PBE implies that …rm 1 infers …rm 2's type after the rati…cation stage. When playing the Cournot game under complete information, …rm 1 receives either 1 (0) = (0:15) 2 (if …rm 2 has high cost), or 1 (1) = 1 12 2 (if …rm 2 has low cost).
The expected pro…t level of …rm 1 is the average of these two pro…t levels 1 2 1 (0) + 1 2 1 (1) 1:4722 10 2 , which is smaller than its unique BE payo¤ from the Cournot game played under the interim belief.
The remaining task is constructing a mechanism which will indeed be accepted by the low cost type of …rm 2 and rejected by its high cost type. Consider the following simple mechanism which does not respond to the messages by the two …rms (the message set for either …rm is singleton): Whenever it is accepted, the mechanism instructs the …rms to set production levels q 1 = 0, q 2 = 0:175, and …rm 2 to pay 1 12 2 to …rm 1 as a side payment.
This corresponds to an allocation where …rm 2 produces its monopoly output for its low cost type and compensates …rm 1 for its foregone Cournot pro…t. Once this mechanism is announced, there exists a PBE of the continuation game, where …rm 1 and the low cost type of …rm 2 accept the mechanism, but the high cost type of …rm 2 rejects it. In case of a rejection by …rm 2, …rm 1 learns that its rival has the high unit cost and therefore chooses its own monopoly output level of q 1 = 0:15. If both …rms accept, then the mechanism dictates the output and side payment levels as above (The complete formal construction of the equilibrium is in the Appendix, Section 5.2). This equilibrium supports an allocation rule which leaves …rm 1 with the expected pro…t 1:4722 10 2 . Construction of this equilibrium is based on the fact that …rm 1's expected pro…t in the default Cournot game is lower whenever …rm 1 infers its competitor's type.
10 Firm 1's pro…t 1 ( 2 ) is decreasing in 2 . However it is not convex. The information revealed by …rm 2 allows the designer to reduce …rm 1's payo¤ to a convex combination of the values of 1 ( 2 ) under the two degenerate beliefs (See Figure 1 . For ease of demonstration, …gures are not drawn to scale).
Reducing …rm 1's default Cournot pro…t by revealing more information about …rm 2 may sound paradoxical. Resolution of this puzzle comes from noticing that parameter 2 captures not only the …rst order belief of …rm 1, but also the higher order beliefs of both …rms. By providing …rm 1 with information on the type of …rm 2, we are also providing …rm 2 with the knowledge that its rival has better information now. This a¤ects the continuation behavior of both …rms in the Cournot game. In particular, when its type is known to …rm 1, the low cost type of …rm 2 chooses a higher output level (in comparison to its optimal output choice under the interim belief). This sequentially rational response of …rm 2 to the belief update is the driving force for the reduction in …rm 1's expected Cournot pro…t. At …rst glance, it seems as if the allocation rule generated by this equilibrium can be truthfully implemented with the following direct revelation mechanism: Whenever …rm 2 reports low cost to the mechanism, the output and side transfer levels are chosen as above (q 1 = 0, q 2 = 0:175, and …rm 2 pays 1 12 2 to …rm 1). Whenever …rm 2 reports high cost, the mechanism instructs the …rms to mimic their non-cooperative play of the Cournot game under the belief that …rm 2 has high cost (q 1 = 0:15, q 2 = 0 with no side transfer). The problem with this direct revelation mechanism is that if both types of …rm 2 accept this mechanism for sure, then …rm 1 would have the option of rejecting it and playing the Cournot game under the interim belief. This deviation provides …rm 1 with the expected pro…t of 1 (0:5), which is larger than 1:4722 10
2 . This observation also implies that any truthfully implementable allocation rule must leave …rm 1 with a payo¤ at least as large as 1 (0:5).
Our example establishes the existence of an implementable allocation rule which is not truthfully implementable. A question of interest here is whether a designer with plausible preferences would …nd such an allocation rule preferable to the truthfully implementable ones. To see the answer to this question, …rst notice that the industry pro…ts are maximized with the PBE we construct above: In both states of nature, the …rm with the lower cost produces its monopoly output level, and the …rm with the higher cost shuts down. Moreover, …rm 1's expected share of these maximized industry pro…ts is lower than any payo¤ sustainable for this …rm with truthful implementation. Accordingly, this allocation rule dominates all the truthfully implementable ones for a designer whose objective function is the weighted average of the …rms' (ex-ante) payo¤s, with the higher weight assigned to …rm 2's share.
A Lower Bound on the Implementable Payo¤s
The example we developed above indicates that a …rm may be forced to accept a mechanism with a lower payo¤, under the threat that credible information on its rival will be revealed. Since this information is revealed through the non-degenerate rati…cation behavior of the rival, the same payo¤ cannot be truthfully implemented with a direct revelation mechanism unanimously accepted by all the involved parties. Truthfully implementable allocation rules are easily identi…ed with two sets of constraints, ensuring the participation of all players and truthful revelation of their private information. However, existence of implementable but not truthfully implementable allocation rules complicates the characterization of what is implementable. In this part of the paper, we …rst …nd a lower bound on …rm 1's payo¤ for all the implementable allocation rules, including the ones feasible only through equilibrium rejection. Then we use this lower bound to derive a su¢ cient condition (over the parametrization of our Cournot example) under which all the implementable allocation rules are also truthfully implementable. We start with showing that the designer can reduce …rm 1's payo¤ even further by inducing …rm 2 to reveal only partial information on its type. To see this, consider a mechanism which makes the high type of …rm 2 indi¤erent between accepting or rejecting. Suppose the low cost type of …rm 2 accepts this mechanism with probability one, but the high cost type accepts it with probability 1/4 only. Now consider the updated beliefs of …rm 1 after observing its rival's rati…cation decision. If …rm 1 observes a rejection (which happens with probability (1=2) (3=4) = 3=8), it believes that its rival has the high cost for sure ( 2 = 0). Otherwise, when …rm 1 observes an acceptance (with probability 5=8), the Bayes formula reveals the conditional probability of facing a low cost rival as The rati…cation probabilities above are not chosen at random. As depicted in Figures 2 and 3 , …rm 1's expected Cournot pro…t here is the value corresponding to the interim belief 2 = 0:5 on the biconjugate function which borders co ( 1 ) from below, where co ( 1 ) is the convex hull of the graph of the function 1 ( ). The biconjugate function is formally de…ned as
Notice that 1 ( ) is the largest convex function that is weakly smaller than 1 ( ) for every value of 2 .
Whatever mechanism is o¤ered by the designer, …rm 1 always has the option of rejecting it and triggering the default Cournot game. By doing so, …rm 1 receives a Cournot pro…t on function 1 ( ). The exact level of the pro…t will be determined by what …rm 1 learns from the rival's rati…cation behavior. After observing this behavior, …rm 1's belief will be updated to either one of the two posterior beliefs. The values of the posterior beliefs depend on the nature of the (randomized) rati…cation decisions of the types of …rm 2. However the Bayes rule requires that the expected posterior equals the interim belief 2 = 0:5. At the rati…cation stage, what is relevant for …rm 1 is the expected value of the two pro…t levels corresponding to these two posteriors. Depending on …rm 2's rati…cation strategy, this expected pro…t can be anywhere on the line segment [AB] drawn in Figure 2 . Since the expected Cournot pro…t is at least as large as 1 (0:5) 1:4688 10 2 , this value constitutes a lower bound on the implementable payo¤s for …rm 1.
The way that we make use of the biconjugate of function 1 ( ) closely resembles Kamenica and Gentzkow's (2009) utilization of the concave closure of a sender's payo¤ as a function of a receiver's posterior in a persuasion game environment. In their formulation, the sender chooses the posteriors of Figure 2 : Convex hull of the pro…t function the receiver on condition that the expectation over the posteriors equals the prior. In this setting, the maximized value of the sender's expected payo¤ is on the concave closure of his payo¤ function, which borders the convex hull of the payo¤ function's graph from above.
11 In contrast to Kamenica and Gentzkow's sender -receiver setting, we study a mechanism design environment and try to outline the implementable allocation rules. This problem induces the minimization of the outside option for the participants of the mechanism. That is why we are interested in the biconjugate function, which borders the convex hull of the graph of 1 ( ) from below.
The relation between function 1 and its biconjugate will also produce a su¢ cient condition to rule out the need for an equilibrium rejection as part of an implementation. We have already seen that any truthfully implementable allocation rule would provide …rm 1 with a payo¤ at least as large as 1 (0:5), its Cournot pro…t level corresponding to the interim belief. If this pro…t 11 Aumann and Maschler (1995) and Goemans and Fay (2009) refer to a similar concave closure to study maximization problems where the choice variable is the distribution under the constraint that its expectation equals a constant. Figure 3 : Derivation of the biconjugate function level was already on the biconjugate of function 1 , that is if functions 1 and 1 gave the same value for the interim belief, then revealing further information about the rival …rm would not have reduced …rm 1's Cournot pro…t. For instance, if the interim belief of …rm 1 was weakly larger than 0:8 (instead of being equal to 0:5) in our Cournot example, then we would not be able to enlarge the implementable set beyond the truthfully implementable allocation rules.
The Model
In this section, we study a general mechanism design setting, with an arbitrary number of agents and an arbitrary default game as the outside option. To be consistent with the language of the previous section, we continue referring to the agents of our model as …rms. N = f1; 2; :::; jN jg is the …nite set which accepts these …rms as its elements. For each …rm i 2 N , we let i denote the set of …nitely many types available for this …rm.
At the start of the interaction, …rm i observes its own type i 2 i , which is a random variable for the other …rms. We assume that types of di¤erent …rms are statistically independent. The initial beliefs of the other …rms on the type of …rm i are represented by the interim distribution 0 i 2 i . The value of 0 i ( i ) gives the probability that …rms other than …rm i attribute to the event that …rm i has type i at the time that the interaction between the …rms starts.
The Default Game under Arbitrary Beliefs
In the default game, each …rm i can choose an output level from the set of available output levels Q i (or more generally an action from the set of available actions). Firm i's direct pro…t in the default game is a function of the pro…le of the chosen output levels and its type:
where R is the set of real numbers. The set of …rms, the type spaces, the available output levels, and the pro…t functions de…ne a Bayesian game together with the interim beliefs speci…ed earlier. However, since we will allow for the default game to be played under updated beliefs, we study this game under an arbitrary belief system = f i g i2N rather than the interim beliefs. As in the de…nition of the interim beliefs, i is an element of i and i ( i ) yields the probability that the other …rms are attributing to the event that …rm i has type i when they are playing the default game.
N; f i g i2N ; fQ i g i2N ; fu i g i2N , and constitute a Bayesian Default Game. The choice variable for …rm i is its (possibly randomized) output level, which can be conditioned on the realization of its type:
In equilibrium, each type of each …rm chooses its output level to maximize its expected direct pro…t in the default game. The beliefs enter into the picture in the calculation of these expected pro…ts. Under the arbitrary belief system , a Bayesian equilibrium of the default game is de…ned as a collection of output functions fq i g i2N such that output level (or any output level in the support of randomization) q i ( i ) is a solution to
for all i 2 N and all i 2 i . 12 We restrict attention to default games which have at least one Bayesian equilibrium for all possible beliefs (Existence is assured whenever all Q i 's are …nite sets). For equilibrium fq i g i2N under belief system , expected pro…t for type i is E i u i (q i ( i ) ; q i ( i ) ; i ) j i . Due to the possibility of multiple equilibria, there may be more than one expected pro…t level consistent with some belief system. We de…ne i as the correspondence that maps the type of …rm i and the belief system to the expected equilibrium pro…ts. That is, i i ; i ; i is the set of the expected equilibrium pro…t levels for type i , when the default game is played under belief system i ; i .
As was the case with the Cournot example of the previous section, the largest function which is convex in i and which takes values weakly smaller than the values of correspondence i i ; i ; i everywhere will have an important part in our analysis of the general model. With a minor abuse of terminology, we refer to this function as the biconjugate function for correspondence i and de…ne it as i i ; i ; i = inf x :
i ; x 2 co ( i ( i ; i ; )) , where co ( i ( i ; i ; )) refers to the convex hull of the graph of correspondence i ( i ; i ; ) for …xed values of i and i .
The Message Game under Arbitrary Beliefs
The cartel mechanism, if accepted, instructs the …rms what output levels they should choose in the default game. Moreover, the mechanism allows for transferable payo¤s between the …rms by stipulating monetary side transfers. The mechanism can condition these choices on revelations by (the messages of) the …rms. Formally a mechanism is comprised of a message set M i for each …rm i, an output function determining the …rms'(possibly randomized) production levels : i2N M i ! i2N Q i , and a side transfer function : i2N M i ! R jN j subject to the constraint that the transfers the …rms receive from each other add up to 0 under all states. 13 We can construct the payo¤ (net of the side transfer) of a …rm taking part in this mechanism by using the pro…t functions in the default game. Suppose that the …rms send the message pro…le m 2 i2N M i to the mechanism. In this case, …rm i with type i will end up with payo¤
where i (m) is the transfer …rm i receives (the i th component of vector (m)). Once these payo¤ functions are de…ned, an accepted mechanism induces a message game between the …rms. The choice variable for each …rm is its (possibly randomized) message, which can be conditioned on the realization of its type:
Each type of each …rm chooses a message to maximize its expected payo¤. As in our discussion of the default game, the expected payo¤ is well de…ned only under some belief system . Under the arbitrary belief system , a Bayesian equilibrium of the message game is a collection of message functions fm i g i2N such that message (or any message in the support of randomization)
for all i 2 N and all i 2 i .
Rati…cation
After the …rms observe the default game and the mechanism, they simultaneously decide whether to accept the mechanism or not. We represent …rm i's rati…cation decision with the binary variable r i (equals to y if …rm i accepts, to n otherwise). Firm i can condition the probability of acceptance on its private information:
We refer to r = fr i g i2N as a rati…cation pro…le. Since there are a total of jN j …rms and each of them can choose one of the two decisions, there are 2 jN j di¤erent possible rati…cation pro…les. After the rati…cation stage, …rms observe each others'rati…cation decisions. In other words, the realized vector r becomes public information. This observation gives the …rms the opportunity to update beliefs on each other. Whenever …rm i accepts the mechanism, the belief of the other …rms on the type of …rm i is represented by y i 2 i . Similarly, n i 2 i gives the rival …rms'belief if …rm i rejects the mechanism. 14 The mechanism comes into e¤ect in the event that it is accepted unanimously by all …rms (that is, when the rati…cation pro…le is a vector composed of y's). In this case, each …rm sends its message to the mechanism. By using these messages as inputs, functions and determine the output and side transfer levels, and eventually the payo¤s of the …rms.
On the other hand, the mechanism is vetoed whenever there exists some …rm(s) rejecting it at the rati…cation stage. Notice that there are 2 jN j 1 di¤erent rati…cation pro…les under which the mechanism will be rejected by at least one of the …rms. We let V denote the set of these 2 jN j 1 rati…cation pro…les that lead to a veto of the mechanism. After learning the realized rati…cation pro…le r, each …rm decides on its default game output level. The direct pro…ts of the …rms from the default game are determined by these output levels.
The Equilibrium
Given the default game, the interim beliefs, and the proposed mechanism, the resulting interaction between the …rms can be thought as a sequential game. We now specify the Bayesian (behavior) strategies and beliefs constituting a Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) of this game: which together satisfy the conditions listed below: i) fm i g i2N constitutes a Bayesian Equilibrium of the message game induced by the mechanism under the belief system f y i g i2N . ii) For each rati…cation pro…le r 2 V leading to a veto of the mechanism, fq r i g i2N constitutes a Bayesian Equilibrium of the default game under the belief system f r i i g i2N . iii) For each …rm i 2 N and each type i 2 i , i ( i ) maximizes the expected continuation payo¤, given the rival …rms' rati…cation behavior i and the continuation strategies of all …rms fm i g i2N ; fq i g i2N .
14 With this notation, we impose the restriction that two di¤erent …rms, which have observed the same o¤ the equilibrium path decision by a rival …rm, will hold the same belief about this rival. This condition is automatically satis…ed when the solution concept is Sequential equilibrium. Making this restriction is also commonplace for Perfect Bayesian equilibrium. iv) f y i g i2N and f n i g i2N are derived by the Bayes formula on the equilibrium path. That is,
if i is not constant at 0
if i is not constant at 1.
Now that we are equipped with the formal statement of our solution concept, we can use the de…nitions in Section 2 to refer to the implementable and truthfully implementable allocation rules in this general setting.
The Analysis
By rejecting a mechanism, …rm i guarantees that the continuation game will be the default game instead of the message game stipulated by the mechanism. Nevertheless, at the time of its rejection, …rm i does not necessarily know the beliefs under which the default game will be played. The belief on …rm i's type itself, n i , is pinned down by the equilibrium. However, the belief on the type of a rival …rm, say …rm j, will depend on whether …rm j accepts the mechanism ( y j ) or joins …rm i in rejecting it ( n j ). The realization of …rm j's rati…cation decision is unknown to …rm i at the rati…cation stage. What is important to notice here is that, since beliefs y j and n j are both derived from the Bayes rule (whenever …rm j's rati…cation decision is non-degenerate), the expected belief on …rm j's type is equal to the interim belief:
Recall that i is de…ned as the correspondence which gives the possible pro…t levels when the default game is played under di¤erent beliefs. Accordingly, i i ; n i ;
gives the possible pro…t levels for type i of …rm i if the default game is played under belief system n i ;
. As we have seen in the previous section, when the default game may be played under a variety of belief systems, …rm i's expected pro…t can be strictly lower than the values of i under the interim beliefs. We use the biconjugate function i to establish a lower bound on the equilibrium payo¤ of …rm i. Proposition 1 Consider a mechanism and a PBE i ; m i ; fq of the continuation game. Under this equilibrium, the expected payo¤ of …rm i with type i is at least as large as i i ;
The proof is relegated to the Appendix. This result yields a lower bound on the equilibrium payo¤ as a function of the rejection beliefs speci…ed by the equilibrium. In order to get a bound that refers only to the primitives of the problem, it su¢ ces to minimize i over the beliefs on …rm i.
Corollary 1
The Cournot default game we covered in Section 2 is an example of the case where the biconjugate function i lies strictly below the correspondence i for some beliefs. In the analysis of this example we have seen that this situation brings the opportunity of reducing the payo¤ of a …rm below its default game Bayesian equilibrium pro…t under the interim beliefs. However supporting any such payo¤ requires the construction of an equilibrium where some rival …rm signals part of its private information with its rati…cation of the mechanism. For this signal to have an informative value, both accepting and rejecting the mechanism must be equilibrium behavior for this rival …rm. Since truthful implementation demands for a unanimous acceptance of a direct revelation mechanism by all types of all …rms, no such payo¤ is truthfully implementable.
On the other hand, if the values of function i and correspondence i coincide for the interim belief 0 i for all types of all …rms regardless of the belief i , then considering rejections on the equilibrium path does not extend the set of implementable outcomes. In other words, this condition rules out the implementable allocation rules which are not truthfully implementable. We conclude our analysis with the formalization of this result, which we prove in the Appendix. 
Conclusion
In this paper, we studied a mechanism design problem where players either accept a mechanism or play a default game non-cooperatively. Default games are more di¢ cult to handle than (possibly type contingent) exogenous allocations as outside options of mechanisms. The di¢ culty arises from the existence of allocation rules which are implementable only if a mechanism is rejected on the path of play. Although our modeling of this problem is in line with most of the earlier literature, it is certainly not the unique way to address a mechanism design setting. We conclude the paper with a discussion of alternative modeling assumptions. 15 Pre-play communication in the default game: Rejection of a mechanism on the equilibrium path is crucial for implementation of certain allocation rules since a rejection has the potential to reveal information on the type of the rejecting player. In this case the default game is played in light of this additional information. An alternative way of providing players with the opportunity to signal their types is allowing for pre-play communication in the default game. 16 However exchanging cheap talk messages in a pre-play communication stage is not a perfect substitute for equilibrium rejection of a mechanism. The latter form of communication determines whether a mechanism will take e¤ect or not, and therefore carries an inherent cost for the players, unlike sending cheap talk messages.
Unobservable rati…cation decisions:
We assumed in our analysis that each player's acceptance or rejection of the mechanism is observed by all the others. An alternative approach is assuming that the players only …nd out whether a mechanism takes e¤ect or not, instead of learning about every individual rati…cation decision. Notice that, under this alternative assumption, a player who accepts the mechanism will still infer some information about its rivals by simply observing if the mechanism is unanimously accepted. In this case, rejection of the mechanism signals the existence of at least one player who has refused to participate, giving the opportunity for a belief update. Therefore, even when the individual rati…cation decisions are unobserved, it is still possible to construct allocation rules which are implementable only with mechanisms rejected on the equilibrium path.
Mechanisms o¤ered by players: Suppose the mechanism is o¤ered not by a designer, but by one of the players who has private information. This assumption creates an informed principal setting. 17 The analysis we provide in this paper suggests that there are allocation rules which are implementable only if this informed principal signals his type with the choice of the mechanism. This is in contrast with the inscrutability principle, which applies to settings with exogenous outside options and which indicates that any available allocation rule can be supported with an equilibrium where the principal o¤ers the same mechanism regardless of his type.
Appendix
BE of the Default Cournot Game
The Cournot game with private information, which we utilized to construct our example in Section 2, can be analyzed within the framework developed in Section 3. Any nonnegative output level is available to either …rm, which means that Q i = R + for i = 1; 2. The pro…t levels of the …rms are u i = [1 (q i + q j ) c i ] q i , where c i indicates the unit cost. The unit cost of …rm 1 equals to 0.7 and …rm 2's cost level is either l = 0.65 or h = 1. Since the type space of …rm 2 is binary, the belief on its type ( 2 ) can be represented by the probability of this …rm assuming the low cost type l. The interim belief on …rm 2's type is given as 0 2 = 0:5. When applying the de…nition of the Bayesian equilibrium to the Cournot game, the …rst point to note is the dominant strategy of …rm 2 with the high cost level. Whenever …rm 2 has unit cost 1, its pro…t function is given as (q 1 + q 2 (h))q 2 (h), which is maximized with the output choice q 2 (h) = 0. Therefore the equilibrium output level of the high cost type of …rm 2 is determined as zero regardless of the beliefs. Zero output brings zero pro…t to this …rm. Now we move to the output levels of …rm 1 as well as the low cost type of …rm 2. Since the latter …rm has unit cost 0.65, its pro…t level is given by the function (1 q 1 q 2 (l) 0:65) q 2 (l), which is maximized with the output choice q 2 (l) = for the relevant values of q 1 . To derive a similar reaction function for …rm 1, notice that the expected output level by …rm 2 is 2 q 2 (l). Since …rm 1 has cost 0:7, its reaction function is written as
for the relevant values of q 2 (l). When we solve for the two reaction functions simultaneously, we get the unique BE output levels as functions of parameter After substituting these values in the (expected) pro…t functions, we see that the maximized levels of the pro…ts are (q 1 ) 2 and (q 2 (l)) 2 for these two …rms.
The Mechanism and PBE of the Induced Game
The mechanism constructed in Section 2 does not make use of the messages sent after acceptance. Accordingly, message sets M 1 and M 2 are both singleton. The output levels following a unanimous acceptance of the mechanism are 1 = 0 and 2 = 0:175. When the mechanism takes e¤ect, …rm 2 makes the monetary transfer of 1 = To prove that this is indeed an equilibrium, we need to establish that the strategies and the beliefs above satisfy the four conditions of PBE: i) Since the induced message game is a degenerate game without any message choices for the …rms, this condition is trivially satis…ed.
ii) For r 2 = y, the belief For r 2 = n, the belief r 2 = 0 dictates that …rm 1 produces the monopoly output level 0:15 . As a best response, …rm 2 with low cost produces 0:1 and …rm 2 with high cost produces 0.
iii) By rejecting the mechanism, …rm 1 receives the average of 2 by accepting the mechanism and (0:1) 2 by rejecting it. Since acceptance brings a larger payo¤, 2 (l) = 1 is optimal. Firm 2 with high cost receives a negative payo¤ by accepting the mechanism and 0 by rejecting it. Therefore the optimal rati…cation decision induces 2 (h) = 0 as well.
iv) The rati…cation behavior separates the two types of …rm 2. Bayes rule dictates that 
Proof of Proposition 1
Suppose …rm i rejects the mechanism at the rati…cation stage. Following this rejection, the belief on the type of …rm i is updated to 
Proof of Proposition 2
We start with an arbitrary implementable allocation rule. There exists a (possibly indirect) mechanism M and a PBE E = i ; m i ; fq On the other hand, there is no consistency requirement for the o¤ the equilibrium path rejection beliefs in E d . In our construction, we set these beliefs to be the same as the rejection beliefs of equilibrium E : specify the continuation behavior of …rm i following an o¤ the equilibrium path rejection. We set these functions to be the Bayesian equilibrium output functions of the default game under the corresponding beliefs
(satisfying condition (ii) of the de…nition of PBE).
To complete the proof, we need to show that truthful revelation of the type and acceptance of the mechanism constitute an equilibrium together with the beliefs , this deviation will bring type i the same payo¤ as mimicking the equilibrium strategy of type^ i in E (that is, following strategy i ^ i ; m i ^ i ; n q r i
after the announcement of mechanism M . Since rati…cation, message, and output decisions are made optimally under E , imitating type^ i does not bring a strictly higher expected payo¤ to type i of …rm i (satisfying condition (i) of the de…nition of PBE). Acceptance of the mechanism: By unilaterally rejecting this mechanism, …rm i guarantees playing the default game under beliefs (satisfying condition (iii) of the de…nition of PBE).
